Category: Appellate

I want to discuss another great decision that was delivered on March 26, 2025 in Crawford v. State, PD-0243-23. Majority opinion here.

This case involves Shawn Edward Crawford who was charged with assault of a Sheriff’s deputy. The central legal question was whether the indictment, which described the victim as “a public servant, to wit: Menard County Deputy Sheriff,” allowed the State to obtain a conviction for assault on a peace officer (a second-degree felony) rather than just assault on a public servant (a third-degree felony).

The case history:

• Crawford was charged after an altercation with law enforcement where he resisted arrest and assaulted Deputy Sheriff Burl Hagler
• The indictment’s caption referenced “assault peace officer/judge” but the body text used “public servant” language
• Crawford was convicted and sentenced to 12 years (within range for second-degree felony but exceeding the 10-year maximum for third-degree felony)
• The Court of Appeals ruled that the indictment only supported a charge of assault on a public servant (third-degree felony) and reversed the sentence

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the Court of Appeals:

• The majority opinion (written by Judge Parker) held that the “deputy sheriff” description in the indictment was sufficient to establish the “peace officer” element
• The dissenting judges (led by Judges Walker and Newell) argued the body of the indictment explicitly charged assault on a public servant, not assault on a peace officer

The key legal dispute centers on whether descriptive language about the type of public servant can effectively transform the charge into a different offense, or whether the explicit statutory language in the body of the indictment controls.

Once again, Judge Parker has demonstrated her exceptional legal acumen with a common-sense approach that prioritizes justice over technicalities. Her opinion in this case shows why she’s quickly become one of the most respected jurists on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

The majority opinion rightly recognized that everyone involved in this case–from the grand jury to the trial participants–understood exactly what crime was being charged: assault on a peace officer. There was never any confusion until an appellate attorney seized upon a technical distinction to try to undo the fair punishment that Crawford received for his violent actions against law enforcement.

Judge Parker’s analysis of descriptive averments brilliantly cuts through the procedural smokescreens to focus on what truly matters–that the indictment contained every fact needed to establish assault on a peace officer. By recognizing that a deputy sheriff is statutorily defined as a peace officer, the majority opinion properly upheld the jury’s verdict and the corresponding sentence.

This case exemplifies Judge Parker’s judicial philosophy of looking beyond empty formalism to ensure that justice is served. Her opinion reminds us that our criminal justice system functions best when we respect the substance of charges rather than allowing technical loopholes to undermine appropriate punishments for those who assault the brave men and women who serve in law enforcement.

In the realm of judicial decisions, the publication status of opinions—whether majority, concurring, or dissenting—plays a pivotal role in determining their precedential value and influence on future cases. Typically, majority opinions are published to establish binding precedent, guiding lower courts and informing the public of the legal rationale behind a court’s decision. Dissenting opinions, on the other hand, are often published to document alternative viewpoints, even though they do not hold precedential authority.

Case Background: Ex parte Ramiro Guerra

A recent example highlighting this dynamic is the case of Ex parte Ramiro Guerra. In this instance, the majority opinion was unpublished, while the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Yeary, was published. Guerra had pleaded guilty to two counts of manslaughter involving a motor vehicle and was sentenced to concurrent nine-year prison terms. Post-sentencing, the victims’ families sought leniency, leading to discussions about potential shock probation—a legal avenue unavailable due to the deadly weapon finding associated with Guerra’s vehicle. Guerra’s counsel did not file a motion for a new trial, which both the prosecutor and the trial court later indicated they would have supported to accommodate the victims’ families’ wishes. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Guerra relief, allowing him to file an out-of-time motion for a new trial. Justice Yeary’s published dissent argued against this decision, emphasizing the lack of valid legal grounds for such a motion and cautioning against circumventing statutory restrictions on probation in cases involving deadly weapons.

The Anomaly of Published Dissents with Unpublished Majorities

The scenario where a dissenting opinion is published while the majority opinion remains unpublished is uncommon and raises intriguing questions about judicial transparency and the dissemination of legal reasoning. Unpublished majority opinions are generally considered non-precedential and are often used in cases that do not introduce new legal principles or are deemed routine. However, when a dissenting opinion is published in such contexts, it suggests that the dissenting judges believe the case addresses significant legal issues worthy of public attention and future consideration.

Implications and Significance

Publishing a dissenting opinion, even when the majority chooses not to publish, serves several purposes:

1. Highlighting Legal Disagreements: It brings to light substantial disagreements within the court regarding legal interpretations, which can be crucial for the development of the law.

2. Guiding Future Cases: While not binding, published dissents can influence future judicial reasoning and may be cited as persuasive authority when similar legal issues arise.

3. Promoting Transparency: It ensures that the judiciary’s deliberative processes are open to scrutiny, fostering public trust in the legal system.

Conclusion

The decision to publish a dissenting opinion while leaving the majority opinion unpublished is a deliberate choice that underscores the importance of the issues at stake from the dissenting judge’s perspective. It reflects the dynamic nature of legal interpretation and the ongoing dialogue within the judiciary concerning the application and evolution of the law. Such practices, though uncommon, play a vital role in enriching legal discourse and ensuring that diverse judicial perspectives are accessible for future consideration.

So, I thought this was interesting as I’ve never seen it happen before. Is it common?

Court reporter Cheryl Dixon was recently summoned to appear before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals after failing to complete the appellate record for Cedric Marks, a Bell County death row inmate. Dixon, responsible for documenting a substantial portion of Marks’ trial—including extensive voir dire proceedings and the first two weeks of testimony—cited personal and health issues as reasons for the delay. Originally due in October 2023, Dixon reported being only “halfway” finished with her transcripts as of now, prompting the court to find her in contempt. An extension has been granted until March 25th, with a follow-up show cause hearing scheduled for March 26th, at which Dixon could face possible confinement or fines if she does not meet the new deadline.

The unusual situation involving seven different court reporters to transcribe this single, albeit lengthy, death penalty trial underscores a significant systemic problem within Texas’ judicial system. Typically, a case—even complex ones—might involve one or two court reporters at most. However, the necessity of having seven individuals highlights the immense pressure, extensive workload, and scarcity of certified professionals currently available to Texas courts.

Indeed, Texas faces a critical shortage of certified court reporters. Factors like an aging workforce, declining numbers of training programs, and concerns over job security amid advancing technology have created a severe shortage. The ripple effects are felt across the state’s justice system, manifesting as significant delays in legal proceedings, increased workloads for existing reporters, and an increased reliance on less accurate transcription methods.

For those exploring career options, especially younger individuals seeking stability and rewarding work, court reporting offers an excellent career path. Court reporters can earn salaries often exceeding $100,000 annually, along with job security, flexibility, and the opportunity to play a crucial role in the justice system. By stepping into this profession, you could directly help alleviate these challenges, ensuring the wheels of justice continue to turn smoothly.

If you’re looking for a meaningful career with strong financial and personal rewards, consider becoming a certified court reporter in Texas. Your skills could make a real difference in ensuring timely justice for all.

In a recently published dissent, Judge Gina Parker of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained her opposition to the majority’s decision in Ex parte Samuel Sanchez, Jr. 

Judge Parker, joined by Judges Yeary and Keel, argued that the Court’s application of a recent precedent was overly broad and failed to account for critical factual distinctions that should have led to a different outcome.

Case Background

Samuel Sanchez Jr. was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to seventy-five years’ imprisonment, with the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirming his conviction in 2008. In October 2023, Sanchez filed a habeas corpus application alleging that prosecutor Ralph Petty had worked simultaneously as a prosecutor on his case and as a judicial legal clerk. This dual role arrangement had become a significant legal issue in Midland County cases.

The controversy centers around Ralph Petty, who was compensated by Midland County district courts for work on habeas applications while also being employed as a prosecutor in the District Attorney’s Office. This arrangement began in 2002 when Judge John Hyde sought this setup, creating what later courts would describe as a “serious conflict of interest.”

The Legal Issue

The central issue before the Court was whether Petty’s alleged dual role as both prosecutor and judicial clerk violated Sanchez’s due process right to a fair and impartial judge. The Court had to determine whether the precedent established in Ex parte Lewis, which granted relief based on such a conflict, should apply to Sanchez’s case despite some factual differences. 688 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

The Majority’s Decision

In December 2023, the Court initially denied Sanchez’s application without a written order. However, after the Court’s decision in Ex parte Lewis, it reconsidered that decision on its own motion. In the Lewis case, the Court had determined that “the appearance of impropriety” created by a prosecutor simultaneously working as a judge’s law clerk entitled all related defendants to relief.

Following this precedent, the majority withdrew its previous ruling and granted relief to Sanchez. The judgment in his case was set aside, and Sanchez was remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Midland County to answer the original charge.

Judge Parker’s Dissent

Judge Parker disagreed with the majority’s decision, arguing that two critical facts distinguished Sanchez’s case from Lewis and should have led to a different outcome.

First, Parker emphasized that unlike in Lewis, a different judge presided over Sanchez’s trial. Judge Robin Darr provided a sworn affidavit stating she never employed Petty as her law clerk and had no ex parte conversations with him. The habeas trial court found these statements credible. Parker argued the Court should defer to these supported-by-the-record findings.

Second, Parker noted that Petty’s involvement in Sanchez’s case was substantially more limited than in Lewis. Beyond possibly ghost-writing some motions (none bearing his name), Petty’s participation was restricted to the guilt-stage jury-charge conference. Importantly, Judge Darr ruled against Petty on the only contested issues that were litigated, showing no bias in his favor.

Parker proposed a more nuanced approach–a “rebuttable presumption of bias” standard rather than an automatic rule. She argued that while a judicial clerk’s conflict might raise concerns, it shouldn’t automatically disqualify a judge if the facts show no actual bias occurred. In Sanchez’s case, Parker believed the evidence clearly rebutted any presumption of bias “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The Bright-Line Rule versus a Case-by-Case Analysis

It’s difficult to determine whether a bright-line rule (as the majority seems to prefer) or a case-specific analysis (as Parker advocates) better serves justice in these situations. Bright-line rules provide clarity, consistency, and protect the appearance of judicial integrity. They eliminate the need for courts to assess the subjective impact of potential conflicts in each case.

However, as Judge Parker’s dissent rightly illustrates: bright-line rules may lead to overturned convictions in cases where no actual prejudice occurred. A more fact-intensive approach allows courts to distinguish between situations where a dual role genuinely compromised the defendant’s rights and those where it was merely a technical concern.

The challenge lies in balancing the integrity of the judicial system with practical considerations. If we require reversal in every case involving even the appearance of impropriety, we may impose significant costs on the justice system by retrying cases where no actual bias affected the outcome. Conversely, if we allow too much discretion in determining which conflicts matter, we risk undermining public confidence in judicial impartiality.

This case demonstrates that reasonable jurists can disagree about where to draw these lines, highlighting the ongoing tension between categorical rules and individualized justice that permeates our legal system. In the end, though, I think Judge Parker gets this one right.